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The Informal Company Law Expert Group (ICLEG) was established by the European Commission (EC) 
in May 2014 to assist it with expert advice on issues of company law and it held its first meeting on 
26 June 2014. The agendas of its meetings are available online at the webpage maintained by the 
EC1. 
The members of ICLEG are: 
1. ARMOUR John 
2. BARTKUS Gintautas 
3. CLARKE Blanaid 
4. CONAC Pierre-Henri 
5. DE KLUIVER Harm-Jan 
6. FLEISCHER Holger 
7. FUENTES NAHARRO Mónica 
8. HANSEN Jesper Lau  
9. KNAPP Vanessa  
10. LAMANDINI Marco 
11. RADWAN Arkadiusz 
12. TEICHMANN Christoph 
13. VAN HET KAAR Robbert 
14. WINNER Martin 
On 26 January 2015, the EC requested ICLEG to consider the issue of information on groups. In 
response to this call one member, Martin Winner, was charged with producing a report on behalf 
of the Group. After consultation within the Group, this report reflects the advice of ICLEG to the EC 
as to matters that ICLEG believe merit further consideration. 
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Disclaimer: As this paper has been drafted by ICLEG, it solely reflects the views 
of the Group. It should not in any way be interpreted as representing the views 
of the EC. It should also be noted that the report purports to present a range of 
ideas that can inspire the EC in its further possible work on group companies. 
We have not considered whether these ideas are politically feasible and the 
range of ideas, opinions and recommendations are not necessarily supported by 
each and every member of the Group, although in general we believe that they 
are worthy of serious consideration and further consultation with other 
interested parties. We generally believe that it is important to prepare any 
legislative initiative by detailed consultation with the affected parties, notably 
companies, investors and public authorities, and we recommend that this be 
done to the greatest extent possible both on the general principles and, once 
the general principles have been established, on detailed proposals for any 
action. 
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1. Introduction 
The Commission’s action plan of December 20122 announced an initiative on simplified 
communication of a group’s structure to investors (pp. 14 et seq.). This announcement is based 
inter alia on the Report of the Reflection Group from 20113 (pp. 68 et seq.), which recommends 
making basic information on the group structure readily available to investors and presenting that 
information in an investor-friendly manner. 
2. State of Play 
Rules on information on groups can be encountered both at EU level and at the national level. 
2.1 State of Play at EU Level 
EU legislation already contains various references to information about groups, both for listed and 
unlisted companies. 
i) Accounting Directives 
Directive 2013/34/EU of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial statements, consolidated financial 
statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings4 contains rules for both the parent 
company and the subsidiary.  
For the parent company, Art. 17 (1) (g) Directive 2013/34/EU provides for the notes to the financial 
statements of medium-sized and large undertakings to include “the name and registered office of 
each of the undertakings in which the undertaking
5
 […] holds a participating interest, showing the 
proportion of the capital held, the amount of capital and reserves, and the profit or loss for the 
latest financial year of the undertaking concerned for which financial statements have been 
adopted”. A participating interest means an interest creating a durable link between the 
undertakings, which is presumed to exist where it exceeds a percentage threshold fixed by the 
Member States which is lower than or equal to 20 % (Art. 2 (3) Directive 2013/34/EU). In effect, the 
accounting rules lead to the disclosure of direct subsidiaries (not of the entire group), but also of 
substantial holdings in other companies, which do not enable the company to exercise a dominant 
influence. 
The notes to the consolidated financial statements contain further information on the parent 
company: 
 Art. 28 (2) Directive 2013/34/EU stipulates that the notes to those statements must set out the 
names and registered offices of all undertakings included in the consolidation, in addition to the 
proportion of capital held in these undertakings. Additionally, the notes have to state whether the 
                                                          
2
 Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more engaged 
shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012) 740 final. 
3
 Report of the Reflection Group on EU Company Law, 5 April 2011 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/reflectiongroup_report_en.pdf ). 
4
 OJ L 182, 29.6.2013, p. 19. 
5
 Purely indirect holdings (via other subsidiaries) are not covered. 
6 
 
undertaking has been included in the consolidation due to a direct or indirect holding or due to 
other factors (cf. Art. 22 (1), (2) and (7) Directive 2013/34/EU). 
 Art. 28 (2) (d) Directive 2013/34/EU stipulates that the notes to the consolidated accounts must 
include information on companies, in which group members hold a participating interest. Thus, the 
consolidated accounts cover both direct and indirect holdings. 
Obviously, under the EU accounting regime, information in the consolidated accounts of the parent 
company contains information on groups. However, some points have to be made.  
 First, the Directive makes consolidation mandatory only for companies in which the parent has the 
power to exercise or actually exercises a dominant influence or control due to a holding of more 
than 50% of the voting rights. The actual exercise of a dominant influence on the basis of a holding 
below that threshold only triggers the obligation to consolidate accounts if the Member State 
chooses to implement such a rule (cf. Art. 22 (2) Directive 2013/34/EU). Such companies may only 
be included in the list of companies in which the parent holds a participating interest (or not even 
recorded if the direct or indirect holding is below 20%). 
 Second, the information only contains a list of companies – including the reasons for consolidation – 
without any description or visualisation of the group structure. 
For the subsidiary, the notes to the financial statements of medium-sized and large undertakings 
have to include the name and the registered office of the undertaking which draws up the 
consolidated financial statements of the largest body of undertakings of which the undertaking 
forms part as a subsidiary undertaking (Art. 17 (1) (l) Directive 2013/34/EU). Additionally, the notes 
have to include the name and registered office of the undertaking which draws up the consolidated 
financial statements of the smallest body of undertakings of which the undertaking forms part as a 
subsidiary undertaking (Art. 17 (1) (m) Directive 2013/34/EU).  
In general, this provision is not designed to publish control structures but rather to give guidance as 
to when the interested public is entitled to have access to consolidated statements. Therefore, it 
covers cross-border groups as long as the parent is subject to the obligation to consolidate 
accounts. Additionally, there is no information on groups in the accounts of subsidiaries which are 
small undertakings within the meaning of Directive 2013/34/EU. 
ii) International Accounting Standards 
For the parent company’s consolidated accounts IFRS 10 stipulates the conditions which lead to 
mandatory consolidation. The guiding principle is control. The relevant (broad) definition of control 
is contained in IFRS 10.6: “An investor controls an investee when it is exposed, or has rights, to 
variable returns from its involvement with the investee and has the ability to affect those returns 
through its power over the investee.”  
IFRS 12 contains disclosure provisions aiming at improving the information about the subsidiaries 
that are consolidated. Special emphasis is placed on the nature and risks involved with the parent’s 
investment in other companies and their financial effects on the parent (IFRS 12.1). Especially, an 
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entity shall disclose the composition of the group (IFRS 12.10 (a) (i)) and significant judgements and 
assumptions it has made in determining that it has control of other entities included in the 
consolidated accounts (IFRS 12.7 (a)). The extensive information requirements focus on financial 
aspects (e.g. according to IFRS 12.14 the entity has to disclose any duty to provide financial support 
to its subsidiaries), but do not look at operations or governance structures. 
Under IAS 27.16, a parent has to include a list of significant investments in its subsidiaries and 
associates in its separate financial statements, including the name of those investees, the principal 
place of business (and country of incorporation, if different) of those investees, and its proportion 
of the ownership interest (and its proportion of the voting rights, if different) held in those 
investees. 
According to IAS 1.138 (c) any entity shall disclose in its notes the name of its parent and the 
ultimate parent of the group. Similarly, IAS 24.13 on Related Party Transactions obliges any entity 
to disclose the name of its parent and the ultimate controlling party, irrespective of whether there 
have been transactions between them; the definition of control is the one contained in IFRS 10.6 
cited above. Thus, subsidiaries drawing up accounts according to International Accounting 
Standards have to disclose the identity of the ultimate controlling party, irrespective of whether 
this is a company, a natural person or any other entity. 
iii) Capital Markets Regulation 
Companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market in a Member State are 
subject to additional requirements. From the point of view of a subsidiary: 
 According to Art. 9 of Directive 2004/109 (as amended by Directive 2013/50/EU6) (Transparency 
Directive) shareholders have to disclose if as a result of acquisitions they hold at least 5%, 10%, 15%, 
20%, 25%, 30%, 50% or 75% of the shares with voting rights; the information is made public. Thus, 
the disclosure focuses on the abstract voting power, but does neither look at whether that voting 
power is actually used nor cover instances where control is exercised without any acquisition 
touching a threshold. In other words, disclosure covers shareholdings, but not control structures. 
 According to Art. 10 Directive 2004/25/EC7 (Takeover Directive), which applies to companies 
governed by the laws of Member States where all or some of their securities are admitted to trading 
on a regulated market in one or more Member States, the company’s annual report has to include 
additional information on shares with special control rights; this information has to be included in 
the management report as part of the corporate governance statement (Art. 20 Directive 
2013/34/EU). Of special interest for the purpose of this study is the disclosure of :  
- significant direct and indirect shareholdings  
- holders of any securities with special control rights and their description 
- restrictions on voting rights  
- known shareholders’ agreements with restrictions on voting rights. 
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 OJ L 294, 6.11.2013, p. 13. 
7
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Again, this information does not focus directly on whether the company is a subsidiary in a group, 
although it contains important information in that respect.  
 According to Commission Regulation (EC) No 809/20048 as last amended by Commission Delegated 
Regulation (EU) No 759/20139 (Prospectus Regulation) additional information on groups has to be 
disclosed in the prospectus. When issuing shares,10 the issuer has to disclose a brief description of 
the group and the issuer's position within the group, if it is part of a group and a list of the issuer's 
significant subsidiaries, including name, country of incorporation or residence, proportion of 
ownership interest and, if different, proportion of voting power held (Annex I No 7 Regulation 
809/2004). If the issuer is a subsidiary, it has to state whether it is directly or indirectly owned or 
controlled and by whom and describe the nature of such control and describe the measures in place 
to ensure that such control is not abused (Annex I No 18.3). Finally, disclosure also covers 
information relating to the undertakings in which the issuer holds a proportion of the capital likely 
to have a significant effect on the assessment of its own assets and liabilities, financial position or 
profits and losses (Annex I No 25). Of course, the information is only disclosed upon issuing 
securities and not corrected after the prospectus has lost its validity. 
iv) Money Laundering 
The recent Directive 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the 
purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing
11
 (to be transposed by 26 June 2017) contains 
a general prohibition on such activities. One measure to make such a prohibition effective is 
increased transparency as to the natural persons who are beneficial owners in companies. 
Certain obliged entities (especially credit institutions, financial institutions, auditors, notaries, 
lawyers) must take customer due diligence measures, especially to identify the beneficial owner of 
their customer, before carrying out certain transactions (cf. Art. 11 and 13 Directive 2015/849). For 
that purpose, Member States must ensure that corporate or legal entities established within their 
territory obtain and hold adequate, accurate and current information on their beneficial ownership 
(Art. 30 (1) Directive 2015/849); this information must be held in a central register, which is 
accessible for the authorities, obliged entities and anyone who can demonstrate a legitimate 
interest (Art. 30 (3) and (5) Directive 2015/849). A legitimate interest by a third person must 
concern the aims of the Directive, that is money laundering, terrorist financing and associated 
offences; thus, a creditor looking for the parent company of a subsidiary responsible for its debts or 
an investor wanting to know the ultimate controlling shareholder of a company will not be able to 
access the information unless the Member State has required the information to be made public. 
Additionally, Directive 2015/849 does not concern itself with control, but (in line with its purposes) 
with beneficial ownership and, therefore, with natural persons (cf. Art. 3 (6)). Thus, if the company 
ultimately is controlled by another legal entity, which in turn does not have a controlling 
shareholder, this information will not be entered into the register. Of course, typical groups are not 
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controlled by a natural person, but are generally led by corporate entities. Behind these corporate 
entities there could be one or more natural persons who own the shares. 
2.2 State of Play at National Level 
Legislative Acts of some Member States contain additional provisions, especially pertaining to 
controlling shareholders.  
Art. 2497 bis Italian Codice Civile requires the company to indicate in its correspondence and official 
documents its parent company, i.e. the company with directing and coordinating powers over the 
company; both private and public companies are covered. Membership in a group is also required to 
be recorded in a special section of the Companies' Registrar, indicating the entities exercising 
management and coordination and those that are subject to these activities. Additionally, the 
subsidiary’s notes to the financial statements have to include information on the relationship with 
the ultimate parent and its group (that presumably includes transactions). Additionally, for listed 
companies Art. 122 TUIF stipulates that agreements regarding the exercise of voting rights in such 
companies and their parent companies have to be published in extract form in a national daily 
newspaper and filed at the Companies Register; otherwise such agreements shall be void.  
In Ireland, the subsidiary must disclose that it is availing of the exception to publish accounts as its 
parent has published consolidated accounts. 
Similar rules on voting agreements are contained in Art. 19 of Portuguese Código dos Valores 
Mobiliários for listed companies.  
The Draft of a new Spanish Commercial Code includes several sections/articles on disclosure about 
groups. Article 291-6 imposes a duty to inform the general meeting and the general public via the 
annual accounts on the entry into or exit from a group on the directors; the accounts have to 
include additional information on the functioning of the group. Article 291-7 imposes a duty to 
inscribe the group at the Companies’ Register and to include that information on the corporate 
website, if any. Article 291-8 addresses corresponding liability issues. 
3. Problems 
Stakeholders, and in particular creditors and investors have a legitimate interest in knowing the 
structure of the group to which the company belongs – either as a parent company or as a 
subsidiary.  
Creditors and investors in a subsidiary may want to know which entity decides how the funds they 
have put at the company’s disposal will be employed and which entity takes the ultimate decision 
as to the company’s business policy; in case of unenforceability of a claim due to insufficient funds, 
they may want to clarify the role of the parent company in the subsidiary’s demise – and, 
therefore, its identity. 
Creditors and especially investors in the parent company may want to know the structure of the 
group the parent manages. They would like to have access to the main features of a company’s 
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group structure in a clear and investor-friendly manner, especially for subsidiaries which are 
material for the success of the group led by the parent company. 
Finally, such information may be of interest to the public as well if this interest is not covered 
already by specialised EU legislation. 
The current legislative framework at the European level does not meet these expectations entirely: 
As far as the parent company is concerned, EU accounting rules lead to a disclosure of the names of 
entities in which the company holds a participating interest, which do not necessarily have to be 
subject to the control of the company; the consolidated accounts will only disclose participations of 
more than 50% of the voting rights if the Member State has not implemented a duty to consolidate 
if a dominant influence exists below that threshold. In all cases, accounting rules only cover the 
identity of the subsidiaries and the shares held by the parent company, but no further information 
or visualisation. Prospectus rules for listed companies contain further information, but no general 
duty to update such information without a further offer of securities. 
The investors in and creditors of the subsidiary do not receive any information if the subsidiary is a 
small undertaking within the meaning of Directive 2013/34/EU. Only medium-sized and large 
undertakings have to disclose the company drawing up the consolidated financial statement. This 
helps, but does not cover all types of group as parent companies with a holding of less than the 
majority of shares with voting rights. IFRS 24 contains additional and far reaching disclosure rules, 
which, however, are only applicable if the subsidiary draws up accounts according to International 
Accounting Standards. 
ICLEG thinks that this situation should be improved in order to strengthen the information available 
to stakeholders, and in particular to investors and creditors in both the parent and the subsidiary. 
Improved information will lead to less insecurity about who ultimately controls the group. That, in 
turn, can lower the cost of attracting both equity and debt capital (via a lower risk premium) if the 
parent is a respectable entity; even suppliers may be ready to extend credit more easily if they 
know more about the company’s position in the group. Such mandatory disclosure would help the 
group member to convey information about its situation in the group to creditors and investors in a 
standardised manner. Of course, these advantages are not easy to measure; it is generally very 
hard to prove a causal link between particular disclosure requirements and reduced cost of capital. 
In order to avoid burdening companies with substantial costs in exchange for non-quantifiable 
advantages, one should try and keep the information requirements as simple as possible.  
ICLEG is not alone in perceiving these lacunae in the law: 
 In 2011, the Reflection Group pointed out that “(a)lthough there are numerous and detailed rules on 
group information, there is no rule requiring an annual report, corporate governance statement or 
company website to describe the main features of a company’s group structure in a clear and 
investor-friendly manner.”12 This situation has not changed in recent years. The Reflection Group 
suggested that the Corporate Governance Statement should contain basic information on the group 
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functioning and management. This approaches the issue of information on groups from the point of 
view of the parent company. 
 The Forum Europaeum on Company Groups, a group of European law scholars, has recently 
published a policy paper on the management of cross-border company groups,13 which distinguishes 
between service companies with a purely auxiliary function in a group (e.g. as manager of a cash 
pool) and ordinary subsidiaries. It proposed that service companies be required to indicate their 
integration within a group and their service function in their firm name and in their letterhead, 
while ordinary subsidiaries be required to establish transactional reports about their business with 
other group companies. It also proposed that the parent should deliver a structural report, in the 
sense that it indicates the ties of ownership within the group and elucidates the governance system 
observed in the reporting period.14 The Forum thus advocates more transparency at the level of 
both the subsidiary and the parent. 
4. Solutions 
4.1 General 
ICLEG does not support a complete overhaul of the current European information regime on groups 
as contained in the legislative acts described above. We do not think that EU legislation should 
introduce detailed information of a technical nature on groups. Additionally, we do not feel 
comfortable with introducing rules in the realm of company law drafted to facilitate the work of 
public authorities as company law should focus on rules designed to adequately balance the 
interests of (different classes of) shareholders, creditors and other private stakeholders; these 
groups should be the primary addressees of any additional information. 
Recommendation 1: The European information regime on corporate groups should not include 
detailed information of a technical nature. 
However, ICLEG suggests that the Commission should evaluate taking action to supplement the 
current information regime on corporate groups in two different areas, namely information on the 
group for shareholders and creditors of the parent company on the one hand and for shareholders 
and creditors of the subsidiary on the other. 
ICLEG is of the opinion that these issues should be put to stakeholders to get a broader spectrum of 
opinions. Especially, the interested public should be consulted on the following suggestions for 
legislative action: 
4.2 Solutions for Parent Companies 
The group structure is of importance to investors in the parent company. Knowledge of the isolated 
holdings as such is not sufficient; rather, ICLEG believes that investors want to have an overview of 
the structure of the group. However, a detailed analysis of the group functioning would be overly 
burdensome for the companies and, due to its complexity, would probably not be very useful to all 
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but the most sophisticated investors. Therefore, ICLEG endorses the idea brought forward by the 
Reflection Group that companies should provide basic information on the group functioning and 
management. 
Given the proposed focus on investors in the parent company and the fact that providing such 
information could be burdensome for small and medium-sized enterprises, the majority of ICLEG 
members think that the obligation to provide such information should be limited to companies 
listed on a regulated market. Additionally, the principal source of finance for unlisted companies is 
likely to be banks, which are well able to ask questions and obtain information from borrower 
companies about their structure. However, even with unlisted companies other creditors may be 
interested in such information. Therefore, the scope of applicability should be subject to 
consultation. 
Such information is only partially covered by IFRS 12, as (apart from the general duty to explain the 
composition of the group) these provisions focus on the subsidiary’s effects on the financial 
position, financial performance and cash flows of the parent. 
Recommendation 2.1: Companies should make public basic information on the group functioning 
and management in standardised visual form. 
First, we therefore believe that some simplified form of information on the group structure should 
be given. Visualising the group structure in a diagram could improve information quality by 
providing comparatively clear information. Visualisation could help to avoid overly complex 
information (at least for less than highly sophisticated investors) and, thus, information overload, 
even if some accompanying texts may be necessary. ICLEG believes that compliance cost would be 
low as virtually all listed parent companies will have such visualisations for internal purposes, which 
can be adapted for disclosure. As one important benefit of such disclosure would be 
standardisation, i.e. improving comparability with other companies, any visualisation requirements 
like diagrams should be carefully designed and implemented having this key goal in mind.  
Of course, such a visualisation may not be able to include all subsidiaries, but may have to 
concentrate on the principal subsidiaries. ICLEG suggests that the Commission consult on how to 
define principal subsidiaries as materiality could be described e.g. from a financial or from an 
operational point of view. 
One key aspect of any envisaged piece of legislation in this area would be to determine the criteria 
for standardisation and the responsible body for setting up such standards. If it is decided that it is 
not feasible to rely on market practice alone and that a standard setter is needed, we think there 
should be requirements for the standard setter to consult with both those entities for which it 
would set standards and those who would be users of the standardised visual information. 
Second, ICLEG thinks that the parent company should disclose whether it is potentially liable for 
any debts of its subsidiary either due to the type of company or due to contractual arrangements, 
such as sureties or comfort letters. Such an obligation exists under IFRS 12, but could be introduced 
for unlisted companies as well, which could require publication in the company’s financial 
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statements, but could also make use of other methods of publication as addressed in 
Recommendation 2.3. 
Third, one could envisage including additional information, e.g. on the subsidiaries’ functions in the 
group or on financial relationships within the group (cash pooling, transfer pricing etc.). Whether 
such additional information is to be included should be put to the stakeholders for consultation. 
Recommendation 2.2: Companies should inform investors in a simplified manner of the group 
structure, especially by visualisation. Additionally and in cases not already covered by IFRS 12, the 
parent company should disclose whether it is potentially liable for any debts of its subsidiary. 
Stakeholders should be consulted whether any additional information should be included such as 
information on the subsidiaries’ functions in the group or on financial relationships within the 
group. 
Current European Union legislation does not address the issue sufficiently. As shown above, the 
direct or indirect holding as such and the reason for consolidation have to be included in the notes 
to the financial statements of the parent company; additionally IFRS 12 calls for information on the 
financial impact of the subsidiary. If companies include more detailed information on their group 
they do so without any obligation under EU accounting rules.  
ICLEG suggests that the Commission consults on the way for implementing such a proposal. At least 
three possibilities come to mind: 
1. There may be non-binding ways in which such changes can be encouraged. A group 
comprising companies, investors, regulators and other interested parties could provide 
examples of good practice on information about groups and publicise these to encourage 
other companies to adopt them. This could partially be achieved within the framework of 
IFRS 12 (especially as to the composition of the group, but probably not on its 
management) and help in providing information that investors really want, whilst offering 
sufficient flexibility for different sorts of companies. Additionally, such an approach could 
be strengthened by an accompanying document from the Commission (e.g. a 
Recommendation). 
2. European legislation could also mandate that such information be disclosed in the 
company’s Corporate Governance Statement as part of the (consolidated) management 
report on a comply-or-explain basis. Legislation could either prescribe the information to 
be published in detail (in that case a good consultation process could avoid unnecessary or 
overly expensive legislative requirements) or could leave that to market practice (and, thus, 
to self-regulation by stakeholders). Alternatively, European legislation could require that 
certain information has to be disclosed in the notes to the annual report. 
3. Publication on the parent company’s website could also be made mandatory. In order to 
improve accessibility, European legislation could also consider a central web-
site/database, which could hold such information; in that vein, even access via the 
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(interconnected) Business Registers may be an option, which would probably require 
development of software for visualisation. 
Recommendation 2.3: The Commission should consult on whether such information should be 
mandatory, given on a comply-or-explain basis in the Corporate Governance Statement or 
encouraged in a non-legislative manner. Consultation should also cover whether and to what extent 
the type of information to be provided should be included in EU legislation. 
4.3 Solutions for Subsidiaries 
ICLEG believes that for shareholders and creditors of the subsidiary the present situation on the 
European level is unsatisfactory. Stakeholders, and in particular creditors and shareholders of a 
company are interested, first, in whether a company they have given credit to or are invested in is 
subject to control by another entity and, second, in the identity of the controlling entity. That of 
course also holds true for those who are deciding whether to extend credit or to invest.  
If such information is reliable, signalling effects may improve conditions of credit or equity finance 
for companies without a controlling shareholder or with an ultimate parent of good repute. While 
this may not be an issue for professional creditors (especially banks), for whom it may be possible 
to get the requisite information in other ways, it can be of importance to smaller creditors, 
especially those delivering goods or providing services with deferred payments, or business 
partners entering into long-term agreements with the company. As long as such information is not 
complex, small creditors presumably are able to process it; such processing could also be done 
indirectly by information providers like credit bureaus. This reasoning is equally applicable to listed 
or unlisted companies, even if the latter are private companies or SMEs. 
In order to enable these stakeholders to make use of the information, access is a crucial issue. 
Currently, any information on the controlling shareholder is only made public in the annual 
accounts, which are not sufficiently accessible, at least for non-listed companies. In practice, access 
is especially difficult for small creditors, especially from other Member States.  
Additionally, the accounts of small companies do not include information on their subsidiaries or on 
undertakings drawing up the consolidated accounts even if they are accessible. Finally, the 
obligation to consolidate accounts does not cover all cases in which the company belongs to a 
group, especially because Member States have made use of exemptions provided for by Directive 
2013/34/EU.  
Without doubt, the disclosure rules under IFRS 10 (disclosure of the immediate parent and the 
ultimate controlling party in the subsidiary’s accounts) provide important information on control of 
the company, but only for entities drawing up accounts under International Accounting Standards. 
Under the Fourth Money Laundering Directive, companies are only required to keep information 
about individuals who are the beneficial owners of shares and, directly or indirectly, own or control 
the company; additionally, the public at large may not have access to information about the 
persons who control a company as a result of implementation of this Directive, as access to this 
information may be limited to persons who can demonstrate a legitimate interest (in addition to 
access by competent authorities, Financial Intelligence Units and obliged entities). 
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Therefore, ICLEG favours introducing a new rule in European law which obliges companies to give 
information on the direct or indirect shareholder controlling the company (“ultimate parent”). 
Recommendation 3.1: The Commission should consider introducing an obligation to make public 
the identity of any direct or indirect shareholder exercising control over a company (“ultimate 
parent”) and consult on this with stakeholders. 
ICLEG is of the opinion that such a rule should not be restricted to cross-border groups, but should 
cover all groups even if purely national. Although a rule restricted to cross-border groups (with the 
possibility of a roll-out to purely national groups at a later stage) would be easier to justify in the 
European context, such a restricted regime would necessarily be incomplete and lead to different 
levels of information for different groups. Intervention for purely national groups can be justified as 
creating a level playing field for creditors and investors as far as information is concerned; Directive 
2013/34/EU follows that approach.  
For similar reasons and in line with national rules to that effect, we favour an approach that covers 
all companies, not just listed or public companies; creditors’ information requirements are not 
dependent on the legal form. Therefore, IAS 1.138 (c) by itself is not sufficient, as most national 
companies do not apply IFRS. We think that compliance costs for the companies can be minimized 
by the design of the substantive rules. 
Recommendation 3.2: Such an obligation should cover both national and cross-border groups, 
irrespective of whether the subsidiary is listed or not. 
Such a rule has to deal with the question of definition of the entity that actually exercises control 
over the company. ICLEG believes that this should be an important issue in any consultation of 
stakeholders. 
First, one could make use of the definition contained in the Art. 22 Directive 2013/34/EU, that is 
both the 50% threshold and, for the purpose of disclosure mandatorily, the actual exercise of a 
dominant influence on the basis of a holding below that threshold. However, for the purposes of 
disclosure this would have to include ultimate parents domiciled outside of the European Union. An 
advantage would be the low costs of compliance and the fact that market participants already are 
familiar with this definition. Of course, other definitions of control exist, such as the definition 
contained in Art. 3 of the EWC Directive 2009/38/EC15; whether this and similar definitions are 
adequate for the purpose of disclosing the “ultimate parent” has to be assessed separately. 
Second, a new definition could be introduced. This could, as in Art. 2497 bis Italian Codice Civile, 
look at the company or entity whose direction and coordination activity the controlled company is 
subject to. One would have to decide whether to limit such a rule to undertakings with a direct or 
indirect shareholding in the controlled company; this would make the rule easier to apply, but may 
open up possibilities of circumvention as it does not look behind nominee shareholders. Of course, 
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market participants may be confused by yet another definition, which weighs against such an 
approach as long as there are no overriding reasons in favour of such an approach. 
Recommendation 3.3: The Commission should consult on whether a new definition of ultimate 
parent should be introduced for the present purpose or whether an existing definition of control 
should be re-used. 
ICLEG believes that the information to be disclosed should be limited and easy to understand; 
additionally, that helps to keep compliance costs low. The main piece of information is the identity 
of the controlling undertaking for the purposes set out above (cf. 3.). A visualization of the group 
structure on the level of the subsidiary is probably not necessary for information purposes; this 
would greatly increase compliance costs to the controlled entity without providing absolutely 
necessary information.  
Alternatively, disclosure could additionally contain verbal information on group decision-making 
mechanisms. This narrative approach would most probably make disclosure more precise, but 
might increase compliance cost. 
Recommendation 3.4: The Commission should consult on whether disclosure should be limited to 
the identity of the ultimate parent or also include verbal information on group decision-making 
mechanisms. 
The controlled entity will have access to the information it is required to make publicly available. 
That will be comparatively easy as far as direct holdings are concerned, as the company usually will 
know its shareholders – especially if the shareholder exercises control. However, the company may 
not have access to information on indirect shareholdings.  
Therefore, any rule has to impose a disclosure obligation on direct and indirect shareholders, both 
in their role as subsidiaries higher up the chain of command and as controlling entities. That has to 
include a duty to answer the company’s questions.  
This alone would not be sufficient, as it would be overly burdensome on subsidiaries if they had to 
monitor changes to existing control structures. For that reason, both former and new controlling 
shareholders
16
 should be obliged to notify their direct subsidiaries of any change in a control 
position, which then would have to be passed down the chain of control to all subsidiaries affected. 
As this is a rather simple binary information compliance cost for these entities should be low. 
Recommendation 3.5: Any disclosure rule should oblige a direct parent company to inform any 
direct subsidiary of any change in control in relation to it and of any change in relation to any of its 
parent companies of which it has been notified.  
A final issue as regards the substance is the method of making the information available. ICLEG 
wants to draw attention to the fact that disclosure is not made for the purpose of facilitating the 
bringing of claims against parent companies, but for signalling purposes – which of course has 
                                                          
16
 Of course, any such instrument would also have to deal with the role of custodians. 
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consequences for the method of disclosure: The information should be easily accessible for all 
stakeholders. 
Legislation could oblige companies to include such information in the notes to the financial 
statements,17 as provided in IFRS 24.13 for companies drawing up accounts under International 
Accounting Standards. However, as explained above the financial statements may be hard to 
access, especially for small investors or creditors. Additionally, the notes are only updated once a 
year and cannot reflect changes during the financial year.  
A more modern way of communication would be the company website. However, not all 
companies actually have a website. It would be probably be disproportionate to force SMEs to have 
a website for a very limited purpose only. Additionally, it is very hard to verify ex post whether such 
information was actually available at a certain point in time; to rely on the website exclusively does 
not seem appropriate. However, ICLEG could envisage obliging companies to include such 
information on their website if they have one. 
Instead the Commission could consult on whether information on the ultimate parent should be 
entered in the national company register; the information could then be available via the 
interconnection of Business Registers. This is easy to update when a change of status occurs; 
additionally, in most jurisdictions it is easy to ascertain which information was included in the 
register at any point of time. This may be an appropriate approach for sophisticated investors or 
creditors, but more problematic for SMEs as creditors or private individuals as, in practice, they 
often do not have the means to access foreign business registers even though access is being 
constantly improved. 
For these addressees disclosure in the company’s correspondence, including electronic 
correspondence, (as foreseen in Italy; cf. 2.2) could complement the entry in the register. This push 
communication can be updated without substantial cost to the company (as in most cases 
stationery these days is not printed beforehand, but stored online). Stakeholders should be 
consulted on whether such constant information may give a wrong impression as to the parent 
company’s liability and on how such a danger can be mitigated. Of course, the appropriateness of 
the method to be used depends on the disclosure requirements; it would not be practical to 
include detailed information in such a way. 
Recommendation 3.6: The Commission should consult on the method of disclosure, especially 
whether disclosure should be made via the company website, the national company register, the 
company’s correspondence or any combination of the above. 
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Overview of Recommendations: 
Recommendation 1: The European information regime on corporate groups should 
not include detailed information of a technical nature. 
Recommendation 2.1: Companies should make public basic information on the 
group functioning and management in standardised visual form. 
Recommendation 2.2: Companies should inform investors in a simplified manner of 
the central group structure, especially by visualisation. Additionally and in cases not 
already covered by IFRS 12, the parent company should disclose whether it is 
potentially liable for any debts of its subsidiary. Stakeholders should be consulted 
whether any additional information should be included such as information on the 
subsidiaries’ functions in the group or on financial relationships within the group. 
Recommendation 2.3: The Commission should consult on whether such information 
should be mandatory, given on a comply-or-explain basis in the Corporate 
Governance Statement or encouraged in a non-legislative manner. Consultation 
should also cover whether and to what extent the type of information to be 
provided should be included in EU legislation. 
Recommendation 3.1: The Commission should consider introducing an obligation to 
make public the identity of any direct or indirect shareholder exercising control over 
a company (“ultimate parent”) and consult on this with stakeholders 
Recommendation 3.2: Such an obligation should cover both national and cross-
border groups, irrespective of whether the subsidiary is listed or not. 
Recommendation 3.3: The Commission should consult on whether a new definition 
of ultimate parent should be introduced for the present purpose or whether an 
existing definition of control should be re-used. 
Recommendation 3.4: The Commission should consult on whether disclosure should 
be limited to the identity of the ultimate parent or also include verbal information 
on group decision-making mechanisms. 
Recommendation 3.5: Any disclosure rule should oblige a direct parent company to 
inform any direct subsidiary of any change in control in relation to it and of any 
change in relation to any of its parent companies of which it has been notified. 
Recommendation 3.6: The Commission should consult on the method of disclosure, 
especially whether disclosure should be made via the company website, the national 
company register, the company’s correspondence or any combination of the above. 
 
